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JUDICIAL SUPREMACY RE-EXAMINED:
A PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE
G. Sidney Buchanan*

J.

INTRODUCTION

citizen critic recently expressed to me his bitter opposition to
the Warren Court's decisions on school prayer and school desegregation.1 If this critic were elected governor of a state or placed
in some other position of governmental authority, he would almost
certainly use his power to block public school desegregation and to
encourage prayer reading in the public schools. Conceding that our
critic would be acting controversially in so using his power, would
he be acting unconstitutionally? This is the question which this
Article ·will attempt to answer. More generally, this Article will
consider the extent to which a Supreme Court constitutional construction legally binds the rest of the nation.
This question becomes particularly pertinent with the advent of
the Burger Court and a potential change in the Court's judicial
philosophy.2 When we like what the Court is doing, we are more
prone to hail the Court's decisions as "the supreme law of the land"
and to urge instant compliance with them. Generally, such urgings
are wrapped in the verbal cellophane of morality: unless the rest
of the nation immediately shapes its conduct in accordance with the
Court's construction of the Constitution, we will become a nation
of immoral lawbreakers. A casual glance at history reveals the relativity of this argument. From Lincoln's attack on the Dred Scott
decision3 to Roosevelt's battle with the Court in the early years of the

A

• Professor of Law, University of Houston. A.B. 1956, Princeton University; J.D.
1959, University of Michigan.-Ed.
For invaluable critical aid in relation to all major aspects of this article, I express
appreciation to Professors John Mixon and A. A. White of the University of Houston
Law School.
I. Most notably, in the school prayer area, School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962), and, in the
school desegregation area, Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and its progeny.
2. Thus far President Nixon has made four appointments to the Supreme Court.
Recent decisions suggest that the Court will take a more conservative approach in
many areas of constitutional law than did the Warren Court. In the area of criminal
procedure, see, e.g., Kastigar v. United States, 40 U.S.L.W. 4550 (U.S. May 22, 1972)
(a witness who invokes his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination can be
compelled to testify if he is granted immunity from prosecutorial use of his testimony
and evidence derived therefrom); Apodaca v. Oregon, 40 U.S.L.W. 4528 (U.S. May 22,
1972) (states can convict a defendant of a noncapital crime by a less than unanimous
jury verdict); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (a statement inadmissible as part
of the prosecution's case in chief because of a violation of the Miranda reqnirements
can nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's credibility on cross-examination).
3. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). See note 77 infra.
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New Deal,4 assaults upon the Court came primarily from those linked
by political philosophy to the Warren Court's most vigorous supporters. Thus, a shift in the pattern of Court decisions will often
modify a person's commitment to the doctrine of judicial supremacy.
This truism warns against an absolutist approach in defining the
Court's role in the federal system.
Sooner of later, the course of judicial events will compel the
Court to decide whether the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause requires a public school district to overcome racial imbalance resulting from segregated residential patterns, a condition
normally called "de facto" segregation.0 Should the Court hold that
the Constitution requires school districts to eliminate de facto segregation in the public schools, integrationists would rejoice in the
wisdom of the Court's decision, and segregationist hostility to the
Court would intensify. A contrary holding would, of course, initiate
a reversal of these attitudes. More to the point of this Article, either
holding by the Court would have a pervasive impact on the nation.
Such a case would illustrate graphically the current relevance of
asking: Now that the Court has spoken, what next?
In answering the question of "what next," this Article will first
describe two competing models for determining the legal effect of a
Supreme Court decision upon the rest of the nation. These models
will then be applied to each of the remaining parts of the federal
system: the lower federal courts, the state courts, the executive and
legislative branches of the federal government, the executive and
legislative branches of the state governments, and, finally, the private
citizen holding no public office. In each application, this Article will
consider which of the two competing models is most consonant with
the political system established by the Constitution. Thus, analysis
of the competing models will be in terms of what the Constitution
requires within the system it has created and not in terms of what a
different constitution ought to have required. Even with the scope
of inquiry thus limited, it is hard to avoid a certain Olympian concern with "oughtness." Unavoidably, a person's belief concerning
4. In a radio address delivered on March 9, 1937, at the height of his battle with
the Senate over the Court-packing plan, President Roosevelt stated:
We have, therefore, reached the point as a Nation where we must take action
to save the Constitution from the Court and the Court from itself. "\Ve must find
a way to take an appeal from the Supreme Court to the Constitution itself. We
want a Supreme Court which will do justice under the Constitution-not over
it. In our courts we want a government of laws and not of men.
81 CONG. REc. App. pt. 9, 470 (1937).
5. Recently the Court expressly avoided this issue in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Bd. of Educ., 403 U.S. I (1971), a case dealing with the desegregation of "dual" school
districts.
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what the Constitution ought to require will influence his description
of what the Constitution does in fact require. This is particularly
true when we are probing the binding force of a Supreme Court
decision, a question affecting so fundamentally the operation of the
federal system. In this area, a quest for descriptive accuracy slips
ineluctably into an exposition of oughtness. For in. probing the binding force of a Supreme Court decision, we reach the seminal question
of jurisprudence: What makes a legal system obligatory in the first
place?6
A final introductory problem remains. What does it mean to say
that a person is "acting unconstitutionally" in relation to a Supreme
Court constitutional construction? For purposes of this Article, a
person so acts when he violates a legal duty imposed by the federal
system to comply with the Court's construction. Quite clearly, this
definition focuses discussion upon a person's legal obligation within
the federal system and largely excludes consideration of moral obligations unrecognized by law. Moreover, to define "acting unconstitutionally" in terms of legal duty permits this Article's central
question to be rephrased: To what extent is the nation under a legal
duty to comply with a Supreme Court constitutional construction?
II. Two

COMPETING MODELS: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
AND VIABLE TENSION

Two models emerge for determining the binding force of a Supreme Court constitutional construction: the "judicial supremacy"
model and the "viable tension" model.
A. The Judicial Supremacy Model
Under the judicial supremacy model, the Supreme Court assumes
the role of final arbiter within the federal system. In both a literal
and substantive sense, the Constitution means what the Supreme
Court says it means. A Supreme Court decision is equated to a law
of the United States passed "pursuant" to the Constitution and,
therefore, becomes truly the supreme law of the land.7
6. In the context of international law, James L. Brierly has offered a thoughtful
answer to this question: .
If we are to explain ,vhy any kind of law is binding, we cannot avoid some such
assumption as that which the Middle Ages made, and which Greece and Rome
had made before them, when they spoke of natural law. The ultimate explanation of the binding force of all law is that man, whether he is a single individual
or whether he is associated with other men in a state, is constrained, in so far as
he is a reasonable being, to believe that order and not chaos is the governing
principle of the world in which he has to live.
J. BRIERLY, THE LAw OF NATIONS 55-56 (6th ed. 1963).
7. France has adopted a judicial supremacy model under the Fifth Republic requir-
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As applied to another branch of the federal system, the judicial
supremacy model would impose on that branch a constitutional obligation to comply with a Supreme Court decision, not only with respect to the particular case before the Court, but also with respect to
all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. Illustratively, if,
as in Powell v. McCormack, 8 the Supreme Court holds that the power
of Congress to judge the qualification of its elected members is limited to the qualifications of age, citizenship, and residence expressly
set forth in the Constitution, then Congress is obligated to accept the
Court's holding in the Powell case itself and to apply the Powell
holding in all future fact situations involving congressional exclusion
of members. Again, if, as in School District of Abington Township
v. Schempp,9 the Supreme Court holds that a state cannot require
prayer reading in the public schools, then every public school district
in the nation is obligated to accept the Court's holding in Schempp
as the supreme law of the land and to remove state-prescribed prayer
reading from the public schools as promptly as possible. Thus, under
the judicial supremacy model, a Supreme Court decision, by its
own force alone, operates as a rule of law which immediately binds
the entire nation.
Predictability is a basic component of justice.10 In shaping his
conduct, a person needs to know that the legal system will react to
similar fact situations with reasonable consistency. If the legal system
is erratic and capricious, justice suffers. Advocates of judicial supremacy can argue fairly that their model would instill predictability
into the federal system. As applied to any fact situation raising a constitutional issue already decided by the Supreme Court, the judicial
supremacy model would provide a reliable rule for determining what
the Constitution means. Moreover, all public officials, and private
citizens as well, would know that they are obligated instantly to shape
their conduct in accordance with the Supreme Court's construction
of the Constitution. Viewed prospectively, the Court's construction
of the Constitution could be changed only by a subsequent Court
decision or constitutional amendment. This would reduce to a minimum the legal avenues for challenging a Court decision, thereby
ing that the constitutionality of "organic laws" and "regulations of Parliamentary
assemblies" must be determined by a constitutional Council before they become
effective. See CONSTITUTION DU 4 OcrOBRE, art. 61 8: 62 (1958).
8. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
9. 874 U.S. 208 (1968).
10. See Justice Harlan's dissent in Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676,
704-07 (1968), for an expression of concern over the loss of predictability in the law in
the area of obscenity.
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contributing to the decision's longevity. To the extent, therefore,
that predictability within the federal system is a desideratum, the
judicial supremacy model is calculated ideally to promote it.
If predictability is a strength of the judicial supremacy model, its
weakness is partiality. It gives to a Supreme Court decision a legal
efficacy that no action by any other branch of the federal system can
claim. All other branches of the federal system can have their actions
declared unconstitutional by a simple majority of the Supreme
· Court. By contrast, a Court decision parades through the federal
system with almost total constitutional immunity; no other branch
of the federal system can, acting alone, declare the decision unconstitutional. In short, the rest of the federal system is responsible to
the Supreme Court, but the Court is responsible only to itself and a
subsequent constitutional amendment.
Judicial supremacy advocates would argue that various constitutional options exist for challenging a Supreme Court decision and
that these options blunt sufficiently the vice of partiality. In addition
to the obvious option of a constitutional amendment,11 the passage
of time coupled with the election of a new President can produce a
dramatic change in Court personnel and a concomitant reversal of
prior Court decisions. Franklin Roosevelt knew this fact well in the
early years of the New Deal, and Richard Nixon knows it well today.
Although a change in Court personnel is usually incident to death or
normal retirement of a Justice, impeachment, or, more accurately,
its threat, also has a definite role to play in creating Court vacancies.12
Furthermore, under its power to regulate the Court's appellate jurisdiction, Congress can influence significantly the types of cases that
reach the Court.13 Thus, the argument runs, the judicial supremacy
model itself provides ample measures to correct a harmful Supreme
Court decision. However, none of these measures can reach fruition
through a simple majority vote of a single branch of government;
their accomplishment requires substantial time and the action of two
or more governmental branches. More fundamentally, as to the parties before the Court, none of these measures can affect the validity
of a Court decision already rendered. Conceptually, therefore, the
11. U.S. CONST., art. V. A historical example of the constitutional amendment approach is the eleventh amendment, which was expressly adopted to overrule the
Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). And,
although the causal link is less direct, certainly the adoption of the thirteenth and
fourteenth amendments was motivated partly by a desire to eradicate the Court's
holding in Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
12. See U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2, 8.
13. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2.

1284

Michigan Law Review

[Vol, 70:1270

judicial supremacy model does confer on the Court a preferred status
in the federal system. The extent to which this status is justified is,
of course, the central inquiry of this Article.
Pressed to its outer limits, the judicial supremacy model could
create a national climate inimical to political expression regarding
issues decided by the Court. Assume, for example, that a Supreme
Court decision was held in such extreme awe that a moral stigma
would attach to any criticism of the decision or to initiation of any
political process designed to block the decision's continuing effect.
Such a climate would emasculate the first amendment guarantees of
free speech, press, assembly, and petition, in relation to the issues
resolved by the Court. In opposition to this argument, others might
contend that judicial supremacy promotes first amendment guarantees as they relate to the broader spectrum of political expression,
including the multitude of issues not resolved by the Court decision.
In addition, it appears that moral stigma attaches to criticism of few,
if any,, decisions by the Court.
Conceding that judicial supremacy should not emasculate first
amendment guarantees, a more benign application of the model can
still dull the cutting edge of political expression. If the Supreme
Court is the final arbiter of what the Constitution means, a Court
construction of the Constitution becomes more than an act by one
branch of the federal government; instead, it carries the oughtness
potency of the Constitution itself. Thus, under the judicial supremacy model, a Court decision construing the Constitution carries a
moral suasion not present in acts by other branches of the federal
system. In a very real sense, to the general public, the Court's decision is the Constitution.
If the general public does equate a Supreme Court decision with
the Constitution, this places those who wish to challenge the decision
at a tactical disadvantage. Proponents of the Court's decision can
label any attempt to block its continuing effect as an attack on rights
which "the Constitution" now confers. Wrapped in the mantle of the
Constitution, the Court's decision is presumed rebuttably to be
"good." It is impossible to assess the extent to which this halo of
oughtness inhibits criticism of a Court decision and, more importantly, the use of the political process to blunt the decision's continuing effect.14 In some instances, the inhibitory impact is palpable; in
14. L. Brent Bozell has suggested:
If it is true that a construction of the Constitution by the Supreme Court, no
matter how spurious or absurd, no matter how damaging to the organic life of
the country, is eo ipso "the law of the land," unchallengeable even by a law made
by the people's representatives; if it is true that a "constitutional right" can come
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others, it is minimal.15 Whatever the degree of inhibition, its existence should be incorporated as a negative factor into any evaluation
of the judicial supremacy model.
Historically, the Supreme Court has made only infrequent pronouncements on the binding effect of its own decisions; generally; its
concerns have lain elsewhere. Thus, in Marbury v. Madison,16 the
Court's main concern was to establish its right to exercise the power
of judicial review, the power to judge the constitutionality of acts
by other branches of the federal system. In contrast to its dicta, the
Marbury holding was calculated precisely to avoid a confrontation
with the Jeffersonian Republicans and said nothing about the legal
impact of a Supreme Court decision upon the rest of the nation. In
effect, Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury told the nation only this:
No other branch of the federal system can thrust upon the federal
judiciary an act which this Court declares unconstitutional. Without
demeaning the importance of this pronouncement, it does not attempt to fix the nation's obligation to comply with a Supreme Court
decision. Viewed accurately, Marbury did nothing more than create
the issue that this Article will attempt to resolve.
In the 1958 case of Cooper v. Aaron,11 the Supreme Court disagreed with the preceding analysis of Marbury. In Cooper, violence
and disorder generated by actions of the Arkansas governor and legislature impeded implementation of a public school desegregation
program in Little Rock, Arkansas; the program had been formulated
by the Little Rock school board and approved by the lower federal
courts. The Supreme Court held that the state-generated violence
and disorder did not justify postponement of the desegregation program. On these facts, the Court's holding is unexceptionable, involving only the proposition that state governments cannot interfere
into being merely on the Court's say, so that every corrective constitutional amendment can plausibly be represented as an attempt to deprive the people of their
previously vested constitutional rights (and thus easily defeated)-then, where,
in all candor, are we? If a judicial interpretation of the Constitution is, by
definition, the Constitution, wliy then we are in the grips of a judicial despotism.
That is the meaning of despotism. An unchallengeable authority can be benign,
or malevolent, but it is a despotism if the rest of the commonwealth has no
practical alternative to succumbing to its will.
L. BoZELL, THE WARREN REvoLUTION 111-12 (1966). While not subscribing to Bozell's use
of the term "judicial despotism" as characterizing the normal application of the
judicial supremacy model, I believe his language does illustrate forcibly the dangers
flowing from the model's unrestrained application.
15. See Stumpf, The Political Efficacy of Judicial Symbolism, in THE IMPACT OF
SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 58-59 (T. Becker ed. 1969), for a discussion of potential effects
of the Court's prestige on reversal attempts by Congress.
16. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
17. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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·with the enforcement of specific federal court decisions.18 As will be
detailed later, any other holding would produce intolerable chaos in
the federal system. Much more challenging is the Court's dicta concerning Marbury. Responding to the contention that the Arkansas
governor and legislature were not bound by the Court's holding in
Brown v. Board of Education, 19 the Court in Cooper stated:
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "supreme Law of the Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking
for a unanimous Court, referring to the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared in the notable
case of Marbury v. Madison, ••• that "It is emphatically the province
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." This
decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is
supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that
principle has ever since been respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of our constitutional
system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown case is the supreme law
of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect
on the States "any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State
to the Contrary notwithstanding."20
Clearly, the Court here is equating its construction of the Constitution to the supreme law of the land. In so doing, the Court is
advocating the judicial supremacy model. It is not unnatural for the
Court to select the model that most strengthens its position in the
federal system. But it is hoped that the Court's preference for judicial supremacy does not foreclose further inquiry into the matter.
More seriously, the Court's dicta in Cooper imputes to Marbury a
holding on a question that Marshall studiously avoided: the extent
to which a Court decision binds the nation. To place this question in
18. The Court cited United States v. Peters, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 115 (1809), for the
proposition that a state legislator or executive may not constitutionally annul the
judgment of a federal court, and Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), for the
same principle in respect to state governors.
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958). See also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 360 n.12
(1970) CTustice Harlan, concurring):
I cannot, moreover, accept the view, implicit in the dissent, that Congress has any
ultimate responsibility for construing tlie Constitution. It, like all other branches
of government, is constricted by the Constitution and must conform its action to
it. It is this Court, however, and not the Congress that is ultimately charged
with the difficult responsibility of construing the First Amendment.
At least in the first amendment area, Justice Harlan supported the judicial supremacy
model. While according to Congress greater power in the conscientious objector area
than Justice Harlan was willing to grant, Justice White, dissenting in Welsh, 398 U.S.
at 371, concludes: "This involves no surrender of the Court's function as ultimate
arbiter in disputes over interpretation of the Constitution." Thus, like Justice Harlan,
Justice White supports the judicial supremacy model as advanced by the Court in
Cooper.
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sharper focus requires a description and analysis of the viable tension
model.

B.

The Viable Tension Model

In its pristine state, the viable tension model21 accords no binding force to a Supreme Court decision; standing alone, a Court
decision obligates no one. The decision may command respect. ft
may even be followed by the rest of the nation. But until supported
by another branch of the federal system, the decision has no legal
effect. It remains a weighty, but nonobligatory, pronouncement by
one branch of the federal government.
As applied to another branch of the federal system, the viable
tension model would impose on that branch no constitutional obligation to comply with a Supreme Court decision. This lack of obligation would extend to the particular case before the Court and, a
fortiori, to all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. It
would extend even to a case in which the branch itself is substantively a party to the proceedings before the Court. Referring again to
Powell v. McCormack, 22 assume that the Court, in a subsequent proceeding, holds that Powell is entitled to receive the compensation
withheld from him during the two years he was excluded from Congress. Under the viable tension model, Congress would have no obligation to implement this decision. More defiantly, Congress would
have the right to act affirmatively to prevent its fiscal agents from
paying Powell. As to future fact situations involving congressional
exclusion, Congress would have the right to ignore the Court's construction of the Constitution in Powell and to judge the qualifications of its elected members on bases other than age, citizenship, and
residence.
Applying the viable tension model to state-prescribed prayer in
the public schools, the Supreme Court's decision in School District
of Abington Township v. Schempp 23 would, standing alone, impose
no constitutional obligation on any school district not a party to
Schempp and related cases. In its purest form, the logic of viable
21. The idea of things existing in a state of viable tension is not new. In describing
the world view of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus, Bertrand Russell notes: "[He] develops a new theory from these ingredients, and this is his signal discovery and contribution to philosophy: the real world consists in a balanced adjustment of opposing
tendencies. Behind the strife between opposites, according to measures, there lies a
hidden harmony or attunement which is the world." B. RUSSELL, WISDOM OF THE WE.Sr
24 (P. Foulkes ed. 1959).
22. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
23. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).

, .

1
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tension would shield even the Abington School District itself. This
latter extension would, of course, wreck the federal system; realistically, therefore, attention should center on the nicer problem of
the nonparty school districts. Here the viable tension model would
allow these districts to continue state-prescribed prayer in the public
schools until enjoined specifically by court order. Technically, the
very nature of judicial power24 would suggest that only the parties
to a lawsuit are bound by the Court's decree. For reasons to be advanced later, however, this view of the effect of a judicial pronouncement, as applied to the legislative and executive branches of the state
governments, should yield to the countervailing postulate of federal
supremacy. For present descriptive purposes, it is enough to say
only this: With respect to a Supreme Court constitutional construction that stands alone, the viable tension model would authorize
each remaining branch of the federal system to adopt its own version
of the Constitution.
Different reasons exist for rejecting a Supreme Court decision.
A person may accept the decision as a correct interpretation of the
Constitution but reject it as unwise; he may claim that the decision
involves erroneous statutory construction or improper conclusions
of fact. The viable tension model is not concerned with these reasons
for rejection. Concretely, the viable tension model authorizes
Congress to interfere with a specific Court decision only if Congress
believes that the decision is based on an incorrect construction of
the Constitution. If Congress accepts the Court's construction of the
Constitution and believes merely that the decision is unwise,
Congress has no right to interfere with the decision's implementation
in the particular case. These principles would also apply to all other
branches of the federal system. As to future fact situations raising
the same legal issue, the same limitation applies: The right of
Congress or any other branch of the federal system to reject a Court
construction of the Constitution would be conditioned on belief
that the Court's construction is wrong. Here, however, the limitation
is, in the case of congressional rejection, more technical than real.
If, for example, Congress believes that a Court decision is based solely
on erroneous construction of a federal statute, the viable tension
24. In Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911), the Court quoted Justice
Miller's I.EcTuRF.s ON THE CONmTIJTION OF THE UNITED STATES 314 (1891) for the propo•
sition that "'Judicial Power ••• is the power of a court to decide and pronounce a
judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who bring a case before
it for decision.'" (Emphasis added.) Although not directly on point, this definition sug•
gests by negative inference that judicial power has no legal effect on persons and
entities not parties to the litigation.
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model would not be operative, but Congress need only amend the
statute to mold future fact situations in accordance with its will. 25
Thus, the model's triggering condition of disagreement on constitutional construction has meaning largely as a limitation on the
nation's right to interfere with the implementation of a Supreme
Court decision already rendered.
Even with respect to implementation of a decision already
rendered, how meaningful is the limitation? The skeptic would
argue that there is no magic in words; that, for example, if Congress
wants to block implementation of a specific Court decision, Congress
need only mask its true reason for so doing in the guise of a disagreement on constitutional construction; that there is no realistic
check on the power of Congress to characterize deceptively its reason
for rejecting a Court decision.26 The skeptic's argument is superficial
if it ignores the role of oughtness in shaping human conduct. A
nation's conception of oughtness does make a difference. Ultimately,
it is the very thing that makes a legal system work.27 If the bulk
of Americans believed that laws in general ought to be disobeyed,
the legal system would collapse. Viewed accurately, therefore, a
nation's conception of oughtness may well influence the fl.ow of
power within a political system more profoundly than any other
factor. Returning to the congressional example, if nearly all Congressmen believe that Congress ought to reject a Court decision only on
the basis of a disagreement on constitutional construction, this particular conception of oughtness will become the prevailing reality; 28
25. While not precisely on point, congressional enactment of Title I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 245 (1970), may have been partially motivated by
Supreme Court criticism of an earlier civil rights statute, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1970). This
earlier statute, in general terms only, protected federally created rights against private
conspiracies. In his concurring opinion in United States v. Guest, 283 U.S. 745, 785-86
(1966), Justice Brennan commented: "Section 241 is certainly not model legislation for
punishing private conspiracies to interfere with the exercise of the right of equal utilization of state facilities•••• [I]f Congress desires to give the statute more definite scope, it
may find ways of doing so." In Title I of the 1968 Act, Congress did "find ways" "to give
the statute more definite scope" by specifically listing those federally created rights
which are protected against both governmental and private interference. This illustrates
the interplay that often occurs between Congress and the Court in the formulation and
construction of statutes.
26. As a counterthrust to such action by Congress, the Court can also play the game
of deceptive characterization. To avoid the operation of viable tension, the Court could
cast its decision in terms of statutory construction or fact resolution instead of constitutional construction. In the final analysis, only the good sense of Congress and the
Court can prevent the technique of deceptive characterization from being carried to
ludicrous extremes.
27. See note 6 supra.
28. Whetl1er in fact nearly all Congressmen do accept this belief is a question that
I do not attempt to answer. My analysis attempts only to show the impact of this
belief if it were the prevailing norm. Shifting to the federal executive, my rebuttal
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Congress will eschew a rejection based on other reasons. Nor does it
weak.en this analysis to admit readily that in times of stress one
conception of oughtness may yield to a different and more compelling conception of oughtness. That revolution, for example, may
overthrow a legal system in its entirety does not enfeeble a national
belief that laws in general ought to be obeyed. Accordingly, this
paragraph's basic proposition still holds: A national belief that
implementation of a Court decision should be blocked only for a
specified reason would far transcend the possibility of deceptive
characterization; the belief would generate in time a potent conformity in practice.
Turning to another facet of viable tension, the model is concerned primarily with the nation's obligation to comply with a
Supreme Court decision that stands alone, unsupported by any other
branch of the federal system. If one or more of the system's remaining
branches, particularly Congress or the federal executive, support
the decision, the question of the decision's binding effect assumes a
new dimension. For in this setting, opposition to the decision is
more than opposition to a single branch of the federal government;
rather, it is opposition to the decision as re-enforced by other parts
of the federal system. This distinction becomes especially important
in considering the extent to which a Court decision binds the executive and legislative branches of the state governments. Here, as will
be developed later, if both Congress and the federal executive support
the Court decision, a strong federal supremacy argument, unavailable while the decision stands alone, enters the fray. 2° For the
present, it is enough to stress generally the distinction between a
Court decision that stands alone and a decision supported by some
other part of the federal system, a distinction that this Article will
use to reconcile the clashing policy vectors of the viable tension and
judicial supremacy models.
In relation to a Supreme Court decision, the viable tension model
provides generous opportunity for political expression. Quite obviously, if a Court decision, standing alone, binds no one, criticism
of the decision can flourish, uninhibited by any substantial risk of
moral stigma. Equally important, a vigorous adherence to viable
tension would encourage the unfettered use of the political process
of the skeptic's argument may be less persuasive in that a single "renegade" President
is not subject to the same group controls as a maverick Congressman. Conversely, supporting my rebuttal is the fact that a sensible Congress and federal executive arc as
capable as the Court of exercising the restraint necessary to avoid needless friction over
issues of constitutional construction.
29. See text accompanying notes 98-108 infra.
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to thwart the decision's command. Thus, the model would further
"a profound national commitment to the principle that debate on
public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open ...." 30
Moreover, by promoting freedom of expression in relation to Court
decisions, viable tension would remove these decisions from the
pedestal occupied by the Constitution; the confusing blur between a
Court decision and the Constitution would vanish. Whatever its
faults, the viable tension model would be at least a sure defense
against judicial idolatry.
The viable tension model also avoids the vice of partiality among
the various branches of the federal system. Although the model does
not affect the Supreme Court's right to declare acts by other branches
of the federal system unconstitutional, it gives to each of these other
branches a reciprocal right to declare acts by the Supreme Court
unconstitutional. To the extent, therefore, that justice comprehends equality, viable tension is just. Admittedly, this stated virtue
of equality somewhat begs the question, for the central inquiry of
this Article is precisely the extent to which such equality is required
by the Constitution. Perhaps the only true virtue of viable tension's
impartiality is that it re-enforces freedom of expression in relation
to Court decisions and a concomitant attitude of healthy skepticism
toward the myth of Court infallibility.31
If viable tension advances freedom of expression in relation to a
Supreme Court construction of the Constitution, it correspondingly
creates a pervasive uncertainty within the federal system. For,
should each remaining branch of the system exercise its "viable
tension right" to adopt a constitutional construction differing from
the Court's, the resultant clash of competing constructions would
obliterate the Constitution's functional meaning. Battered by conflicting "ought" statements, the citizen would have no reliable
guide for conforming his conduct to constitutional commands. Thus,
viable tension would remove from the federal system the predictability that judicial supremacy would preserve. Not the Supreme
Court, but the vicissitudes of political power would determine the
30. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,270 (1964).
31.

• • • [T]he Supreme Court in American society, which Arnold terms "our most
important symbol of government,'' continues to be regarded as the font of impartiality and legitimacy, of near-infallibility amidst the chaos of conflicting
notions of legality. And even among those writers who are fond of emphasizing
the policymaking or "political" role of the Court (often along with a description of
its liistoncal foibles) one is still likely to find references to the awe and reverence in
which the Court is held-to the magic or sacrosanctity of the Court and its personnel.
Stumpf, supra note 15, at 48.
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prevailing constitutional construction; a type of constitutional
Danvinism would suffuse the nation.
Would this suffusion be necessarily bad? Viable tension advocates
would argue that their model reflects accurately the flow of power
within the federal system. They would stress that each of us has
initially the power to disobey a Supreme Court decision, a congressional act, or any other governmental command. Accordingly, a Court
decision, like an act of Congress, has efficacy only to the extent that
we are compelled by superior force to obey it. Why not, therefore,
let obligation follow power? Less abstractly, why not say that a person
is obligated to comply with a Court construction of the Constitution
only if compelled to do so? By thus wedding obligation to power,
viable tension avoids the anomaly of an obligation hanging impotently in limbo.
The wedding of obligation to power also produces harmful
results. To reject totally the role of oughtness within a legal system
is to make compulsion the determinant of individual commitment
to law. This is the great danger of the pure viable tension model. By
promoting a nationwide belief that individuals may legally ignore
Supreme Court decisions until compelled to obey them, the model
would generate toward these decisions an attitude of inertia, waxing
through increasingly ominous stages of disrespect and open defiance.
Moreover, if individuals must be dragged en masse into sullen
compliance with Court decisions, an erosion of the nation's law
enforcement energies would follow. And, looming behind that practical consequence is the jugular threat of anarchy. If unrestrained,
viable tension invites inexorably a societal condition where "[t]hings
fall apart; the centre cannot hold."32

III.

THE MODELS .APPLmp TO THE FEDERAL SYSTEM

Judicial supremacy and viable tension are each a mixed blessing.
Both models contain strengths and weaknesses; if applied absolutely,
each model becomes untenable. Accordingly, an operable federal
system requires some degree of reconciliation between the competing
models. To determine the degree of reconciliation required, this
section will apply the competing models to the several parts of the
federal system.
As this application is made, a number of policy considerations
will affect the choice between the competing models. The wording

w.

32.
B. Yeats, The Second Coming, in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
(3d ed. 1956).

w. B. YEATS 184
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of the Constitution is a policy consideration of paramount importance. If the constitutional mandate is clear and specific, it creates
expectations in the nation that should not be ignored. To distort a
constitutional provision of patent clarity invites the growth of
cynicism among those subject to the Constitution's commands.
Although many constitutional provisions lack patent clarity, the
search £or a "textually demonstrable constitutional"33 mandate must
still be made. The Constitution may indeed be a living document
whose commands are shaped by the exigencies of society, but this
concept of organic growth has not displaced totally the need £or
constitutional exegesis. Ascertaining the meaning of the Constitution
requires more than taking a Gallup poll of the nation's current
desires.
A second policy consideration involves predictability. A person
needs to know where he stands legally in relation to the system that
governs him.34 This need is urgent with respect to the government
decision-maker who must react to a pronouncement by another
branch of government; it is even more urgent with respect to those
whose lives are affected directly by the decision-maker's reaction.
Accordingly, as the judicial supremacy and viable tension models
are applied to the federal system, an "urgency of predictability"
factor will also be considered in determining the obligation of each
governmental branch to comply with a Supreme Court decision. The
greater the need £or predictability, the more readily should an immediate obligation to comply be found to exist.35
A third policy consideration involves opportunity £or political
endeavor. A political system should encourage orderly change
through legitimate channels. This requires a system that is responsive and that contains within its framework a wide diversity of means
for accomplishing orderly change. A narrow, rigid system stifles
individual and collective initiative; within such a system, creative
political reform becomes very difficult. Thus, as the competing
models are applied to the several parts of the federal system, they
must be judged in each application on the basis of their tendency
to expand or constrict legitimate avenues of political endeavor.
33. This phrase appears in the Court's opinion in :Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217
(1962).
34. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
35. Related to the policy factor of predictability is the argument that the Supreme
Court is in a better position than any other branch of the federal system to function
as the final arbiter on questions of constitutional construction. This argument is considered more fully in my discussion of the application of the competing models to the
legislative and executive branches of the federal government. See text accompanying
note 66 infra.
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There may be a compelling need to preserve a particular governmental branch as a free agent in relation to a Supreme Court decision, as an unfettered avenue for political effort designed to blunt
the decision's continuing effect. Such a need would militate against
an obligation to comply instantly with the decision.116
A final policy consideration involves the relationship between
obligation and power. Although power realities within the federal
system should not determine conclusively the boundaries of legal
obligation, these realities affect legal obligation significantly. If
obligation and power clash continually, "it is evident, the machine
is working in a way the framers of it did not intend."a7 Nor can any
political system long endure a gaping divergence between obligation
and power. With the passage of time, the definition of legal obligation
will yield to the realities of power, or the realities of power will
conform to the definition of legal obligation. Contrarily, a persisting
divergence between obligation and power can destroy the conception
of oughtness that holds a nation together. Hence, the competing
models of judicial supremacy and viable tension must not be applied
in a manner which stretches the divergence between obligation and
power to the breaking point; the analytical task is reconciliation.38

A.

The Lower Federal Courts

The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may
from time to time ordain and establish.89

The judge of a lower federal court should be obligated to comply
instantly with a Supreme Court construction of the Constitution.
36. Related to the policy factor of opportunity for political endeavor is the argument that judicial supremacy is anti-democratic in nature in that it operates contrary
to the principle of majority rule. See note 74 and the accompanying text infra. In
rebuttal, many jurists and writers have contended that in a democratic society, the
Supreme Court has a special role to play in the protection of minority rights against
the passions of the majority. See the oft-quoted footnote 4 in United States v. Carolene
Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938), in which Justice Stone stated that "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition ••• which may call
for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
37. Eakin v. Raub, 12 S. 8: R. 330, 350 (Pa. Sup. Ct. 1825) (Gibson, J., dissenting).
Justice Gibson's dissent contains an elaborate attack on the doctrine of judicial review.
While his arguments have been overwhelmed by the experience of history, the quoted
phrase aptly describes the dangers for a political system of a persisting divergence
between obligation and power.
38. The four policy factors listed in this section are probably not exhaustive of the
policy factors relevant to the choice between judicial supremacy and viable tension,
Hopefully, however, nearly all factors bearing upon this choice can be related reasonably to one or more of these four factors.
39. u.s. CoNsr., art. m, § 1.
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Here, if nowhere else in the federal system, the judicial supremacy
model should be applied vigorously. In this area, any weakening of
judicial supremacy would undermine irreparably the Supreme
Court's appellate power over the lower federal courts.
At this level, all policy considerations point strongly toward
judicial supremacy. The Constitution states clearly that the lower
federal courts are to be "inferior"40 to the Supreme Court; such
inferiority clashes syntactically with the right to reject a Supreme
Court decision. Thus, the wording of the Constitution creates the
expectation that lower federal courts will not engage in internecine
war with the Supreme Court.
Moreover, in relation to a Supreme Court decision, the need for
a predictable reaction by the lower federal courts is urgent. Persons
affected by the federal judiciary need to know that lower federal
court judges will attempt fairly and conscientiously to apply Supreme
Court decisions. Thus, it would be anomalous for a federal district
court judge to reject the holding in Brown v. Board of Education41
because he prefers the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson. 42 For such an attitude to pervade the federal courts would
produce judicial chaos; its unsettling effect on federal court litigants
and the federal system in general would be intolerable. Whatever
difficulties are involved in construing and applying what the
Supreme Court has said, lower federal court judges should regard
themselves as obligated to make the attempt,43 and this obligation
should extend, upon remand, to the particular case before the
Supreme Court and to all future cases raising the same legal issue.
As a further consideration, there is no particular urgency that
lower federal courts serve as a vehicle for political endeavor designed
to blunt the continuing effect of a Supreme Court decision. If there
is to be such a vehicle, other branches of the federal system can
perform this function better. Traditionally, the nation has looked
to the legislative and executive branches of government as more
appropriate conduits for battling the Supreme Court. To enlist
40. U.S. CoNsr., art. I, § 8.
41. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
42. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
43. To what extent may lower federal courts anticipate in their decisions that the
Supreme Court will overrule a former precedent? See Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. Walsh,
139 F.2d 809 (2d Cir.), vacated sub nom. Spector Motor Serv. Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323
U.S. 101 (1944), for the contrasting views of Judges Clark at 814- and Hand (dissenting)
at 823 on this issue. See Barnette v. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ., 47 F. Supp. 251,
252-53 (S.D. W. Va. 1942), afjd., 319 U.S. 624 (1943) for an example of a lower federal
court decision which expressly anticipates that the Supreme Court will overrule a
former precedent.
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lower federal courts for this purpose would promote only political
redundancy.
Finally, to accord lower federal courts a "viable tension" right
to reject Supreme Court decisions would strain unduly the relationship between obligation and power within the federal system. Rebellious federal judges would continually necessitate the application
of federal legislative and executive power to insure the fair enforcement of Supreme Court decisions in the lower federal courts. No
countervailing policy is of such strength as to justify this wasteful
use of federal enforcement energies. If applied to the federal judiciary, the viable tension model would involve lower federal courts in
acts of unseemly futility or, more ominously, would make a shambles
of the federal judicial system envisioned by the Constitution.

B.

The State Courts

In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall
have appellate Jurisdiction, ...44

Ever since Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,45 decided at an early date in
the nation's history, the view has prevailed that the state courts do
have concurrent jurisdiction ·with the federal courts over cases involving a "federal question"46 or, more technically, cases "arising
under this Constitution, the laws of the United States, and Treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their Authority.'' 47
As a concomitant of state court jurisdiction over federal question
cases, the Supreme Court held in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee48 that
Congress had the power to grant to the Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction over federal question cases originating in the state
courts. Building on the arguments advanced by Alexander Hamilton
in The Federalist No. 82, Justice Story found textual support for
this holding in the article III clause that grants to the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction "in all the other Cases before mentioned.''49
If these "other Cases" include federal question cases, and if the state
courts have concurrent jurisdiction over federal question cases, then,
reasoned Story, the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court can
be extended constitutionally to federal question cases originating
· in the state courts. In the words of Hamilton: "The objects of appeal,
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

U.S. CoNsr., art. ID, § 2.
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 339-41.
U.S. CoNsr., art. m, § 2.
14 U.S. (I Wheat.) 304 (1816).
14 U.S. (I Wheat,) at 338-39, quoting U.S. CoNsr., art. III,

§
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not the tribunals from which it is to be made, are alone contemplated."50
That the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over federal
question cases originating in the state courts is thus a premise rooted
firmly in history, the wording of the Constitution, and in judicial
authority. Indeed, the premise continues today as a crucial linchpin
of the federal system. Accepting the premise, the state courts then
become an integral part of the federal judicial system precisely to
the extent that they entertain federal question cases.51 More relevantly, in federal question cases the state courts are in precisely the
same position relative to the Supreme Court as the lower federal
courts. Accordingly, every policy argument used to support an application of the judicial supremacy model to the lower federal courts
can be used ·with equal efficacy to support the application of the same
model to the state courts.
The judicial supremacy model should, therefore, be applied to
the state courts in full strength. To concede to the state courts a
viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court construction of the
Constitution would, as in the case of the lower federal courts, conflict
dramatically with the Supreme Court's appellate power. In Justice
Story's words, the federal judicial system should be free of "jarring
and discordant judgments."52 As concerns the state courts, only a
robust application of judicial supremacy will enable the Supreme
Court, in the resolution of federal questions, to achieve an approximate uniformity throughout the federal judicial system. State court
judges should be obligated to comply instantly with a Supreme Court
construction of the Constitution. Within the framework of the federal judicial system, the Supreme Court should be indeed supreme.
C.

The Legislative and Executive Branches
of the Federal Government

Well: John Marshall has made his decision: now let him enforce
it153
50. THE FEDERALisr No. 82, at 536 (Modern Library Ed. 1937) (Hamilton).
51. The role of the state courts as a part of the federal judicial system is highlighted
in article VI of the Constitution: "and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby
(the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States], any thing in the Constitution
or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
52. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 348.
53. Statement attributed to President Jackson by George N. Briggs of Massachusetts. Briggs was serving as a member of Congress at the time Jackson allegedly made
the statement in response to the Supreme Court's decision in Worcester v. Georgia, 31
U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). H. GREELEY, THE AMERICAN CONFLICT 106 n2.7 (1864).
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In 1830, the state of Georgia passed a law making it a crime for
any white person to reside "within the limits of the Cherokee nation"
without the consent of the governor of Georgia. 54 Shortly thereafter,
in 1831, Samuel A. Worcester engaged in missionary activities among
the Cherokees without the Georgia governor's consent. Accordingly,
Worcester was arrested by Georgia officials, tried in a Georgia state
court, and convicted of violating the 1830 act; as provided by the
act, he was then sentenced to "hard labor" in the state penitentiary
for a term of four years. 55
In Worcester v. Georgia, 56 Worcester appealed his conviction to
the United States Supreme Court. In 1832, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Marshall, the Court reversed Worcester's conviction, holding
that the 1830 Georgia act and hence Worcester's conviction were
unconstitutional because they conflicted with then existing treaties
between the United States and the Cherokee nation. Pursuant to
this holding, the Supreme Court ordered
that all proceedings on the said indictment [of Worcester] do for
ever surcease; and that the said Samuel A. Worcester be and hereby
is henceforth dismissed therefrom, and that he go thereof quit,
without day [sic]. And that a special mandate do go from this court,
to the said [Georgia] superior court, to carry this judgment into execution.57

When the attorneys for Worcester sought enforcement of the Supreme
Court's judgment, President Jackson refused to execute it. According
to Horace Greeley, it is then that Jackson challenged Marshall in
the words quoted at the beginning of this subsection. And so, Greeley
concluded, Worcester "languished years in prison ... in defiance of
the mandate of our highest judicial tribunal." 58
Worcester illustrates dramatically the Supreme Court's dependence upon the federal executive for the execution of its judgments.
More generally, without the support of the co-ordinate branches of
the federal government, a Supreme Court decision is impotent, a
mere pronouncement and nothing more. Concededly, a series of
Court decisions may generate political pressures which eventually
influence Congress and the federal executive in the Court's direction;
but unless these two branches conform promptly to a Court decision,
54. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 523.
55. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 532.
56. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515.
57. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 597.
58. H. GREELEY, supra note 53, at 106. See Burke, The Cherokee Cases: A Study in
Law, Politics, and Morality, 21 STAN. L. REv. 500 (1969), for a recent discussion of
Worcester.
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a ·wide divergence between power-as exercised by Congress and
the federal executive, and obligation-as defined by the Court decision, will persist for a substantial period of time. This divergence
does not preclude application of the judicial supremacy model to
the co-ordinate branches of the federal government, nor does it
dictate automatic application of the viable tension model. It does
mean that here the choice between the competing models is more
difficult to make than in the case of the federal and state judiciaries.
The Constitution does not expressly grant to the Supreme Court
the power of judicial review. 59 To support the exercise of judicial
review in Marbury v. Madison, 60 Marshall had to reason by implication. Even less does the Constitution define the extent to which
a Supreme Court decision binds the nation. This is particularly true
in regard to the decision's binding effect on Congress and the federal
executive. Here, the most diligent search will yield no hint of any
constitutional mandate; on this issue, the Constitution is superbly
silent. Its wording equally supports the application of judicial
supremacy or viable tension to the co-ordinate branches of the
federal government. Moreover, why not select Congress or the federal
executive as the ultimate decision-maker among the three branches
of the federal government? 61 Nothing in the Constitution attaches
greater potency to a Supreme Court decision than to a decision of
Congress or the federal executive. Viewed from any perspective,
the appeal to constitutional exegesis is inconclusive. 62
Indeed, any inference drawn from the Constitution's wording
would favor viable tension among the three branches of the federal
59. Concerning the intent of the framers of the Constitution on the issue of judicial
review, Leonard W. Levy quotes Edward S. Convin:
• • • in blunt language he declared, "The people who say the framers intended
it are talking nonsense"- to which he hastily added, "and the people who say they
did not intend it are talking nonsense." In the same vein he remarked, there is
"great uncertainty." A close textual and contextual examination of the evidence
will not result in an improvement on these propositions.
Levy, Judicial Review, History, and Democracy: An Introduction, in JUDICIAL REvmw
AND THE SUFREME COURT 4 (L. Levy ed. 1967).
60. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marshall's reasoning relied heavily on arguments
advanced by Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST No. 78.
61. Indeed, Great Britain exemplifies a governmental system operating under a
model of parliamentary supremacy. If the choice lay only between legislative or executive supremacy, British history strongly supports the former. In a representative form
of government, legislative supremacy would appear to be the surer shield against
totalitarian government. For reasons advanced in the text accompanying note 66 infra,
on matters of constitutional construction, I would choose judicial supremacy over
legislative or executive supremacy.
62. See A. BICKEL, THE L1i:AsT DANGEROUS BRANCH 5-6 (1962), for a discussion of the
ambiguity of the Constitution concerning the function of the Supreme Court in the
feaeral system.
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government. If anything, the Constitution's first three articles connote equality among the three branches. Such equality is more consistent with a viable tension right in each branch to construe the
Constitution independently than with an obligation on the part of
two branches to comply instantly with a constitutional construction
by the third branch. Nor can judicial supremacy draw support from
the allocation of powers among the three branches. Viewed thusly,
Hamilton's description of the judiciary as the "least dangerous" 03
branch is apt. Syntactically, Congress and the federal executive boast
far greater powers. I£ judicial supremacy is to prevail among the
three branches of the federal government, it must find support elsewhere than in the express wording of the Constitution.
The judicial supremacy model would require Congress and the
federal executive to comply instantly with a Supreme Court decision.
Under this model, the reaction of Congress and the federal executive
to a Court decision would be highly predictable. If this meets an
urgent need, on that basis alone judicial supremacy might well carry
the day. But how urgent is the need? In some respects, predictability
of reaction to a Court decision would be a strongly harmonizing
factor among the three branches of the federal government. For
example, when the Court speaks, the individual Congressman or
federal executive officer would know what reaction is expected of
him in his official capacity. Additionally, persons affected directly
by the reaction of Congress and the federal executive to a Court
decision would know what that reaction ought to entail. More
particularly, litigants asserting rights established by a Court decision
would know that Congress and the federal executive should fairly
enforce those rights. Undoubtedly, these several conceptions of
oughtness would instill greater stability into the federal system. But
the crucial question recurs. Is this greater stability indispensable?
Can the federal system function without it?
Some observers have stated that in relation to the co-ordinate
branches of the federal government, not even the power of judicial
review is an indispensable part of the federal system. This thought
is compressed neatly into Justice Holmes' well-knO'wn statement:
"I do not think the United States would come to an end if we lost
our power to declare an act of Congress void. I do think that the
Union would be imperiled if we could not make that declaration as
to the laws of the several states."64 On the issue of judicial review,
63. Tm: FEDERALIST No. 78 at 504 (Modern Library Ed. 1937) (Hamilton). In other
words, if supremacy turned upon the scope and potency of powers granted under the
Constitution, Congress and the executive branch would clearly prevail over the Court.
64. 0. HoLllras, Law and the Court, in CoLLECl'ED LEGAL PAPERS 291, 295-96 (1920),
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Holm.es' statement recognizes a hierarchy of urgency among the
several parts of the federal system. By analogy, the same hierarchy of urgency would exist on the issue of a Supreme Court decision's binding effect. One who can envision a federal system without
judicial review should have no difficulty in envisioning a system in
which a Supreme Court decision, while binding on the federal
judiciary, has no binding effect on Congress and the federal executive.
Paradoxically, the existence of judicial review supports the application of viable tension to the co-ordinate branches of the federal
government. Judicial review enables the Supreme Court to protect
its own sphere of action, to act as master of its house. More technically, judicial review empowers the Court to determine which acts
by the remaining parts of the federal system will be recognized
within the framework of the federal judiciary. This, arguably, is
judicial review's primary function. 65 So viewed, why is there not an
equal need for "congressional review" and "presidential review"?
As co-equal branches of the federal government, Congress and the
federal executive should have the power to protect their respective
spheres of action from what they regard as unconstitutional encroachment by the Supreme Court. In this game of clashing spheres, why
is the urgency any greater for Congress and the federal executive to
bow before the Supreme Court than for the bows to be reversed?
Every argument using predictability as a basis for adopting judicial
supremacy can be used equally to support congressional or presidential supremacy; the triangle of competing urgencies lies flat on a
horizontal plane.
If, on the issue of constitutional construction, we must stand the
triangle upright, the Supreme Court should be placed at the apex.
Precisely because it is the "least dangerous" branch and the branch
most removed from the transient passions of the day, the Supreme
Court is in a better position than Congress and the federal executive
to deliberate calmly and impartially the enduring implications of a
particular constitutional construction. The Court can more readily
engage in action that is "genuinely principled, resting with respect
to every step that is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and
reasons quite transc,ending the immediate result that is achieved." 66
These truths argue persuasively for the application of judicial su65. See

w.

CRossKEY, 2 POLITICS AND THE CoNmnJTION IN THE HlsrORY OF THE
1002-07 (1953), for an argument that the Constitution was intended to
limit judicial review of congressional acts to those which interfere with judicial operations.
66. Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1001, 1011 (1965).
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premacy to the co-ordinate branches of the federal government, for
standing the triangle upright with the Supreme Court at the apex.
For me, however, they do not ouuveigh the need for preserving intact
the power of congressional and presidential review, the ability of
Congress and the federal executive to protect their respective spheres
of action. I would leave the triangle flat and cease searching for a
champion among the three branches.
Why this concern for preserving congressional and presidential
review? Even if they must operate under judicial supremacy, Congress and the federal executive have a potent array of weapons with
which to battle the Supreme Court.67 These weapons, however, are
suited better for extended warfare than for the immediate skirmish.
They lack efficacy when Congress or the federal executive wishes to
challenge a constitutional construction in a particular case before
the Court. More concretely, if the Supreme Court renders a decision
on the basis of a constitutional construction with which Congress disagrees, it may be precisely that decision which Congress does not
wish to implement. Although such instances will occur rarely, there
may be an urgent need for the ability of Congress to reject the
Court's constitutional construction in the particular case without
incurring the legal opprobrium of the nation. Under the judicial
supremacy model, congressional refusal to implement a specific
Court decision would be an "unconstitutional act," a breach of a
legal duty imposed by the federal system.
Potential offshoots from the recent case of Powell v. McCormack6B
illustrate vividly the need for preserving the right of congressional
review with respect to a particular case before the Supreme Court.
In many ways, Powell is a modern day counterpart of Marbury v.
Madison. As in Marbury, the Court in Powell e.....::ercised the power
of judicial review in a controversial setting and in a way which
avoided direct confrontation with the remaining branches of the
federal government. Through the declaratory judgment device, the
Powell Court was able to claim new ground for judicial review,
while at the same time withholding relief which would have invited
formal congressional repudiation. For example, the Court neatly
sidestepped Powell's petition for a writ of mandamus ordering the
Sergeant-at-Arms of the House of Representative.s to release Powell's
congressional salary for the t\vo years during which Powell was
excluded from Congress. Instead, the Court rested content with
67. See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
68. 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
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its declaratory judgment that the exclusion was unconstitutional.69
As to the other forms of relief sought by Powell, the Court conveniently remanded the case "to the United States District Court for
the District of Columbia with instructions to enter a declaratory
judgment and for further proceedings consistent with this opinion."70
Thus, Congress was left to fulminate against a phantom holding
which created no compelling call to arms.
Suppose, however, that the Supreme Court had ordered the
House Sergeant-at-Arms to release Powell's back pay. Here the confrontation between the Court and Congress would be direct and
dramatic. 71 Under judicial supremacy, Congress would be obligated
to implement instantly the Court's decision by authorizing the
Sergeant-at-Arms to pay Powell. Quite possibly, a strong majority of
Congress would disagree with the Court's construction of the Constitution and would argue that the Court had invaded an area committed by the Constitution to Congress' sole discretion. 72 In this
setting, should the federal system obligate Congress to implement the
Court's decision? How far would the Court have to penetrate into
Congress' internal procedures before the advocates of judicial supremacy would say, "Enough!"? If the concept of co-equal branches
retains any vitality, the federal system should grant to Congress not
only the raw power, but the legal right to protect its sphere of action.
We grant readily to Congress the right to resist presidential encroachments in the "particular case"; this right is the tacit premise undergirding the current debate between Congress and the President over
our nation's military involvement in Indochina. Why should we be
less ready to grant to Congress a parallel right to resist judicial encroachments? The potential ramifications of Powell show that the
need for congressional review can be equally as urgent in the one
case as in the other.
To solve the problem created by Powell, the right of Congress
and the President to reject a Supreme Court constitutional construe69. 395 U.S. at 550.
70. 395 U.S. at 550.
71. Concerning the likelihood of a clash between the Court and Congress, the
Powell Court commented "the Court has noted that it is an 'inadmissible suggestion'
that action might be taken in disregard of a judicial determination. McPherson v.
Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 24 (1892)." 395 U.S. at 549 n.86.
72. See the revealing series of letters from counsel for plaintiff and defendant to the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia upon remand of Powell,
debating the propriety of suggesting to the court that the House of Representatives
might well disobey any affirmative order directed to its agents. The letters are set forth
in McKay, Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17 UCLA L. REv. 117, 126-29 nn.42-44
(1969).
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tion could be limited to Court constructions which interfere with
the procedural machinery of Congress or the federal executive. This
"internal procedure" model of viable tension would leave unscathed
most of the Court's constructions and would enhance predictab_ility
·within the federal system. It would fail, however, to provide legal
protection against constructions by the Court which, while not affecting the internal procedure of the legislative or the executive
branches, might cause great damage to the nation. For example,
Plessy v. Ferguson73 gave legal sanction to segregated public facilities
and did much to foster a belief in the morality of racial segregation
throughout the nation, and particularly in the South. We are still
paying the price of this legacy today.
The Powell case is just one example of a policy consideration
which permeates the federal system: preserving generous opportunity
for political endeavor.74 For reasons already discussed, the federal
system should offer an ample array of legitimate means for seeking
orderly change. And the need for orderly change may relate, albeit
infrequently, to modification or rejection of a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before the Court.
Here, judicial supremacy would provide no legitimate means for
seeking relief. Acquiescence or illegal assertion of power would be
the only available options. Conversely, viable tension, if applied to
Congress and the federal executive, would make those two branches
unencumbered vehicles for political endeavor designed to block implementation of a specific Court decision. Precisely at the time of
need, Congress and the federal executive would then serve as federal
system safety valves for legitimate action against Supreme Court foolishness or usurpation.
Viable tension is not a novel concept. Respected Presidents have
argued for some degree of viable tension among the three branches
of the federal government. In the statements and writings of Jefferson,75 Jackson, 76 Lincoln,77 and Franklin Roosevelt, 78 there is at least
73. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
74. Writing prior to the Warren Court era, Henry Steele Commager expressed
strong hostility to judicial review as a "drag upon democracy" and concluded tliat
"Congress, and not the courts, emerges as the instrument for the realization of the
guarantees of the Bill of Rights." Commager, Judicial Review and Democracy, in
JUDICIAL REvIEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 64, 73 (L. Levy ed. 1967). For a more recent
and more favorable approach toward judicial review, see Rostow, The Democratic
Character of Judicial Review, in JUDICIAL REvlEW AND THE SUPREME COURT 74 (L. Levy
ed. 1967).
75••.• You seem to think it devolved on the judges to decide on the validity
of the sedition law. But nothing in the Constitution has given them a right to de•
cide for the Executive, more than to the Executive to decide for them. Both magis•
tracies are equally independent in the sphere of action assigned to them. The
judges, believing the law constitutional, had a right to pass a sentence of fine and
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imprisonment; because that power was placed in their hands by the Constitution.
But the Executive, believing the law to be unconstitutional, was bound to remit
the c.,;:ecution of it; because that power has been confided to him by the Constitution. That instrument meant that its co-ordinate branches should be checks on
each other. But the opinion which gives to the judges the right to decide what laws
are constitutional, and what not, not only for themselves in their own sphere of
action, but for the Legislature &: Executive also, in their spheres, would make the
judiciary a despotic branch.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Abigail Adams, Sept. ll, 1804, in 8 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 3ll (P. Ford ed. 1897). See also Letter from Thomas Jefferson to
Judge Spencer Roane, Sept. 6, 1819, and Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William C.
Jarvis, Sept. 28, 1820, in IO THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 140-41, 160-61 (P. Ford
ed. 1899). Clearly, Jefferson is here claiming that Congress and the federal executive can
legally reject a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before
the Court, as well as in future fact situations raising the same legal issue.
76•••• It is maintained by the advocates of the bank that its constitutionality
in all its features ought to be considered as settled by precedent and by the decision of the Supreme Court. To this conclusion I can not assent•

.• .• .• The
.
Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for itself be guided

by its own opinion of the Constitution. • • . It is as much the duty of the House
of Representatives, of the Senate, and of the President to decide upon the constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passageor approval as it is of the supreme judges when it may be brought before them for
judicial decision. The opinion of the judges has no more authority over Congress
than the opinion of Congress has over the judges, and on that point the President
is independent of both. The authority of the Supreme Court must not, therefore,
be permitted to control the Congress or the Executive when acting in their legislative capacities, but to have only such influence as the force of their reasoning
may deserve.
Message of Andrew Jackson vetoing the bill to recharter the Bank of the United States,
July 10, 1832, 2 MESSAGES AND PAFERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 576, 581-82 CT• Richardson ed.
1897). Jackson plainly states that Congress and the federal executive can legally reject
a Supreme Court constitutional construction in future fact situations raising the same
legal issue. His language also supports a right of rejection in the particular case before
the Court. Any doubt on this latter point should be resolved by his failure to enforce
the Court's mandate in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
77. In a speech delivered during the Lincoln-Douglas senatorial campaign of 1858,
Lincoln commented in regard to Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857):
••• We do not propose that when Dred Scott has been decided to be a slave by
the court, we as a mob will decide him to be free • • • . [B]ut we nevertheless do
oppose that decision as a political rule which shall be binding on the voter, to
vote for nobody who thinks it wrong, which shall be binding on the members of
Congress or the President to favor no measure that does not actually concur with
the principles of that decision. We do not propose to be bound by it as a political
rule in that way, because we think it lays the foundation not merely of enlarging
and spreading out what we consider an evil, but it lays the foundation for spreading
that evil into the States themselves. We propose so resisting it as to have it reversed if we can, and a new judicial rule established upon this subject..••
Sixth Debate between Abraham Lincoln and Stephen Douglas, Quincy, Ill., Oct.
13, 1858, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245, 255 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
I do not forget the position assumed by some that constitutional questions are to
be decided by the Supreme Court, nor do I deny that such decisions must be binding in any case upon the J;>arties to a suit as to the object of that suit, while they
are also entitled to very high respect and consideration in all parallel cases by all
other departments of the Government•••• [I]f the policy of the Government upon
vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by decisions
of the Supreme Court, the instant they are made in ordinary litigation between
parties in personal actions the people will have ceased to be their own rulers,
having to that extent practically resigned their Government into the hands of that
eminent tribunal.
First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861, 7 MEssAGES AND PAFERS OF
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this common denominator of agreement: In relation to a Supreme
Court constitutional construction, Congress and the federal executive should have a viable tension right to reject the Court's construction in future fact situations raising the same legal issue; that is, the
right to exert continuing pressure on the Court by generating a series
of cases testing the Court's willingness to persist in its construction.
In the Lincoln-Douglas debates, Lincoln expressed this view succinctly in relation to the Dred Scott decision: "If I were in Congress,
and a vote should come up on a question whether slavery should be
prohibited in a new territory, in spite of that Dred Scott decision, I
would vote that it should." 79 Here, Lincoln is saying plainly that
Congress and the federal executive are not obligated to conform their
future conduct to a Supreme Court construction of the Constitution.
They are not obligated, again in Lincoln's words, to adopt the
Court's construction as "a rule of political action for the people and
all the departments of the government." 80 On this issue, Jefferson,
Jackson, and Roosevelt agreed clearly with Lincoln.81
Concerning rejection of a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before the Court, the four Presidents are
THE PRESIDENTS 3210-11 CT, Richardson ed. 1897). See also Addresses of Abraham Lincoln, July 10, 1858, Chicago, Ill., July 17, 1858, Springfield, Ill., in 2 THE CoLLEcn:n
WORKS OF ABRAHAM l.INCOLN 484, 494-95, 504, 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953).

78. The following is an excerpt from a draft of a speech which President Roosevelt
planned to deliver had the Supreme Court decided against the Government on the
constitutionality of abrogating "gold clauses" in federal obligations. In fact, in a li•to-4
decision, the Court upheld the Government's position in Perry v. United States, 294
U.S. 330 (1935).
It is the duty of the Congress and the President to protect the people of the United
States to the best of their ability, It is necessary to protect them from the unin•
tended construction of voluntary acts, as wcll as from intolerable burdens involuntarily imposed. To stand idly by and to permit the decision of the Supreme Court
to be carried through to its logical, inescapable conclusion would so imperil the
economic and political security of this nation that the legislative and executive
officers of the Government must look beyond the narrow letter of contractual obligations, so that they may sustain the substance of the promise originally made in
accord with the actual intention of the parties,
••• I shall immediately take such steps as may be necessary, by proclamation and
by message to the Congress of the United States,
3 F.D.R.: His PERSONAL l.ETTERs, 1928-1945, 456, 459-60 (E. Roosevelt ed. 1950). Although
the precise import of these remarks is unclear, Roosevelt seemingly is here asserting a
legal right to block the continuing effect of the Court's decision in the particular case
before the Court. Beyond cavil, he is asserting with Jefferson, Jackson, and Lincoln a
legal right to reject the Court's decision in future fact situations raising the same legal
issue. In this same draft, Roosevelt quoted with approval from the portion of Lincoln's
First Inaugural Address reproduced in note 77 supra.
79. Address of Abraham Lincoln, Chicago, Ill., July 10, 1858, 2 THE CoLLECTED
WoRKS OF A.BRAHAM LINCOLN 484, 494-95 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
80. Address of Abraham Lincoln, Springfield, Ill., July 17, 1858, 2 THE COL•
LECTED WORKS OF A.BRAHAM LINCOLN 504, 516 (R. Basler ed. 1953).
81. See notes 75, 76 &: 78 supra.
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not in agreement. In his First Inaugural Address, Lincoln conceded
that in this instance the Court's construction should be implemented:
And while it is obviously possible that such decision may be erroneous in any given case, still the evil effect following it, being limited
to that particular case, with the chance that it may be overruled and
never become a precedent for other cases, can better be borne than
could the evils of a different practice.82

In contrast, Jefferson, Jackson, and Roosevelt, with varying degrees
of clarity, seem to argue for a right in Congress and the federal executive to reject the Court's construction even in the particular case
before the Court.83 The tenor of the presidential remarks, especially
Roosevelt's,84 suggests that the right should be exercised sparingly
and only in instances of great need, but for purposes of this analysis,
the crucial fact is the apparent recognition of the right.
More generally, all four Presidents were concerned with preserving within the federal system generous opportunity for political
endeavor, and with preserving Congress and the federal executive
as legitimate avenues for political action designed to blunt the continuing effect of a Supreme Court constitutional construction. While
articulating their concern primarily in relation to future fact situations raising the same legal issue, the four Presidents also stressed the
more generic need for protecting congressional and presidential
prerogatives against judicial encroachments. And with respect to the
particular case before the Court, only the viable tension model af•
fords this needed protection. Here, more than anytvhere else in the
federal system, opportunity for political endeavor becomes a compelling policy consideration.
Would chaos result from application of viable tension to the coordinate branches of the federal government? As stressed earlier, the
82. First Inaugural Address of Abraham Lincoln, March 4, 1861, 7 MESSAGES AND
PAPERS OF nm PRESIDENTS 3210-11
Richardson ed. 1897). Fairly construed, this statement suggests that Lincoln would regard the entire federal system as obligated to comply with a Supreme Court constitutional construction in the particular case before the
Court. Earlier in the Address (see note 77 supra) Lincoln does refer to the Court's
decision as "binding in any case upon the parties to a suit as to the object of that
suit." Technically, this leaves open the question of the decision's binding effect
on governmental departments which are not parties to the litigation.
83. See notes 75, 76 & 78 supra.
84. Viewed as the assertion of a legal right to block the Court in the particular case,
the draft of Roosevelt's speech concerning the "gold clause" cases (see note 78 supra)
vividly illustrates the type of Supreme Court construction that can have a dramatic
impact on the nation. Roosevelt clearly believed that an adverse Court holding would
have created a national economic crisis. In this conte.xt, should the federal system leave
the President only the options of acquiescence or illegal assertion of power? In such an
instance the viable tension model provides a legal safety-valve for the federal system,
a means of enabling the President to generate legally a countervailing political pressure against the Court's constitutional construction in the particular case.

a.
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viable tension model requires a disagreement on constitutional construction.85 Specifically, Congress and the federal e.'Cecutive can reject
implementation of a Supreme Court decision only when they disagree with the constitutional construction upon which the decision
is based. Mere belief that the decision is unwise, ill-timed, or based
on erroneous statutory construction will not trigger the viable tension right of rejection. Thus restricted, how often would this right
of rejection be asserted? Recent history is instructive. From 1953 to
1969, the Warren Court issued a wide range of decisions affecting
fundamentally the political and social patterns of the nation.80 Many
of these decisions were highly controversial. If ever a period was ripe
for congressional or presidential repudiation of the Court, this
would seem to have been that period. And yet, with one arguable exception, 87 the record is barren of any congressional or presidential
action formally repudiating a Warren Court constitutional construction. Grumblings and verbal protests abounded, occasionally coalescing into abortive attempts at formal repudiation or modification.88
85. See text accompanying notes 26-27 supra.
86. Among these decisions were Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (e.xpanding
the rights of the accused subjected to "custodial interrogation" in a criminal proceed•
ing); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (requiring that both houses of a state legislature be apportioned on a population basis); School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963) (prohibiting state-prescribed prayer reading in the public
schools); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (prohibiting state-supported
racial segregation in the public schools).
87. Arguably, Title II of the Crime Control Act of 1968, particularly 18 U.S.C,
§ 350l(b) (1970), constitutes a congressional and presidential repudiation of the Court's
constitutional construction in Miranda. Even here, however, the federal executive purported to be acting in compliance with existing law and did not formally reject the
Miranda holding. On signing the Crime Control Act into law on June 19, 1968, President Johnson commented that "the provisions of Title II, vague and ambiguous as
they are, can, I am advised by the Attorney General, be interpreted in harmony with
the Constitution." N.Y. Times, June 20, 1968, at 23, col. 5.
88. See McKay, Court, Congress and Reapportionment, 63 MICH, L. R.Ev. 255 (1964),
for a discussion of unsuccessful congressional efforts to curtail federal court jurisdiction in legislative apportionment cases. These efforts were a reaction to the Supreme
Court's decisions in Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962). See W. Beaney and E. Beiser, Prayer and Politics: TIie Impact of Engel and
Schempp on the Political Process, in THE lMPAcr OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 20
(T. Becker ed. 1969), for a similar discussion of unsuccessful congressional efforts to
blunt the Court's school prayer decisions in School Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), and Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). For still more
recent developments on the prayer issue, see 117 CONG. REc. H. 10590-658 (daily ed. Nov.
8, 1971) reporting the defeat by the House of Representatives of H.R.J. Res, 191, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1971), a proposed constitutional amendment which would authorize
"voluntary prayer or meditation" in "any public building which is supported in whole
or in part through expenditure of public funds." The proposed amendment failed by
twenty-eight votes to obtain the two-thirds majority required for passage of the amendment. Arguably, this amendment attempt represents a congressional repudiation of viable tension in that Congress has here recoguized that only a constitutional amendment
can overcome the Court's prayer decisions. However, it is possible that Congress chose
the amendment route because it was not ready to create the stronger friction that would
result from a formal repudiation of the Court by a simple majority vote,
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But, no official challenge ever emerged. This history of restraint suggests that Congress and the federal executive would exercise responsibly a viable tension right of rejection; at this level, viable tension
would not invite caprice.89
Judicial supremacy advocates would argue that "this history of
restraint" stems largely from the belief of Congress and the federal
executive that they are obligated legally to comply with the Court's
constitutional constructions, that this is an area where a nation's
conception of oughtness, as nurtured by the experience of history,
has made a difference. Indeed, the increased political endeavor contemplated under the viable tension model may undercut reliance
upon the past history of restraint. I cannot refute this argument
completely. I can suggest that two other factors have contributed to
the restraint: First, even under viable tension, a Supreme Court
constitutional construction would, in Lincoln's phrase, be "entitled
to very high respect and consideration"90 among Congress and the
federal executive. Desire to avoid the friction resulting from a clash
among the branches of the federal government would operate as a
check against casual rejection of the Court. Second, in the Warren
Court era under discussion, Congress and the federal executive, on
the whole, have probably agreed with the Court's major constitutional innovations. And, under viable tension, such would generally
be the case. Congress and the federal executive would follow the
Court, not only to shun the risk of conflict, but more often because
the Court's constitutional construction would commend itself to
reason and would be regarded as "right" on the merits. It takes a
Powell case to push Congress to the brink; and if a Powell case does
occur, congressional resentment at "judicial encroachment" is apt to
ovenvhelm whatever presumption of oughtness the Court's construction may carry.
Reviewing this subsection, the policy factor of opportunity for
political endeavor points strongly toward adoption of viable tension
among the three branches of the federal government. With roughly
equal strength, the policy factor of predictability points toward
judicial supremacy. Standing in the middle, the wording of the
Constitution is a neutral policy factor, discernibly favoring neither
89. This election year has produced intense pressure in Congress for "anti-busing"
legislation. In light of this pressure, the congressional response to the busing issue in
the Education Amendments of 1972 can be characterized as remarkably mild. See
N.Y. Times, June 9, 1972, at 21, cols.1-8, for a summary of the busing provisions adopted
by Congress. This restrained reaction by Congress can be cited as further evidence that
application of the viable tension model to the other federal branches would not lead
to the "constitutional construction by public poll" that some fear.
90. See note 77 supra.
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model. Judged alone by these three factors, the policy arguments for
the competing models are in approximate balance. Thus, the decisive factor favoring viable tension becomes the relationship between
obligation and power. As before noted, if applied to Congress and
the federal executive, judicial supremacy could create situations in
\vhich the definition of legal obligation diverges widely from the
realities of power.91 Unless the cumulative impact of other policy
factors strongly favors judicial supremacy, there is no compelling
reason to risk this wide divergence. Accordingly, I would apply the
viable tension model to Congress and the federal executive. At this
level, viable tension harmonizes power and obligation by recognizing
that Supreme Court decisions depend for their efficacy upon congressional and presidential support. History shows that a President
Jackson can challenge successfully a Chief Justice Marshall; 02 ap•
plied to Congress and the federal executive, viable tension but reflects the experience of history.
If Congress or the federal executive disagrees with a Supreme
Court constitutional construction, the viable tension model should
require that disagreement to be stated expressly. Although this requirement is mechanical only, it would bring home more forcibly
to the dissenting branch the serious nature of its action. Moreover, it
would protect against ambiguous congressional or presidential reaction to a Supreme Court decision; if viable tension is to be triggered, it would at least be triggered openly and forthrightly. Absent
an express rejection of the Court's constitutional construction, Congress and the federal executive should regard themselves as obligated
to comply with the Court's decision. Thus, each Court decision
would carry a rebuttable presumption of oughtness, placing upon
Congress and the federal executive the burden of formulating an
express repudiation. While not depriving viable tension of its sting,
such a burden would make the model more acceptable.
91. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra. Perhaps in recognition of this fact,
the Supreme Court, in Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867), held that
it lacked the power to enjoin directly either the President or Congress. Emphasizing
enforcement problems, the Court stated that if the President disobeyed an injunction,
••• it is needless to observe that the court is without power to enforce its process.
If, on the other hand, the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may occur be•
tween the Executive and Legislative Departments of the Government ••• ? May
not the House of Representatives impeach the President for such refusal? And in
that case could this court interfere, in behalf of the President?
71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 500-01. By way of contrast, the Court has held that it has the
power to issue a writ of mandamus against lesser executive officials to compel the performance of ministerial acts. Kendall v. United States on the Relation of Stokes, 37
U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
92. See text accompanying notes 53-58 supra.
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Professor Wechsler has suggested an alternative approach for determining the binding effect of a Supreme Court decision. In The
Courts and the Constitution,93 Wechsler quotes the passage from
Lincoln's First Inaugural Address94 analyzing the Supreme Court's
role in the federal system. Regarding Lincoln's analysis, Wechsler
comments:
A doctrine that is valid for the President and Congress surely must
be valid also for the State and its officials. But note the purpose of the
limitation stated: to allow for the "chance" that the decision "may
be overruled and never become a precedent for other cases." When
that chance has been exploited and has run its course, with reaffirmation rather than reversal of decision, has not the time arrived when
its acceptance is demanded, ·without insisting on repeated litigation?95

Wechsler's approach contemplates a second swing at bat for any
governmental branch which disagrees with a Supreme Court constitutional construction. If, however, the Court reaffirms its prior construction, this apparently ends the matter. Among the three branches
of the federal government, Wechsler's model of "secondary judicial
supremacy" blunts the potency of congressional and presidential
review. It merely postpones by one step the point in time at which
Congress and the federal executive are required to accept the Court's
construction of the Constitution. It disables Congress and the federal
executive from providing the federal system with adequate protection
against Supreme Court blunders in the particular case before the
Court. More fundamentally, the Wechsler model fails to discriminate
among the various parts of the federal system. While favoring the
Supreme Court too strongly in relation to Congress and the federal
executive, it favors the states too strongly in relation to the Supreme
Court. The legislative and executive branches of the state governments, as well as the state judiciaries, require a more vigorous form
of judicial supremacy than that offered by the Wechsler model. Here,
secondary judicial supremacy would weave too thin a veil of oughtness.
The final problem of this subsection concerns conflict resolution
among the three branches of the federal government. Even if limited
to Congress and the federal executive, viable tension would still
create for the federal system a potential oughtness limbo. This consequence is unavoidable once we grant to Congress and the federal
93. 65 CoLUM, L, REv. 1001 (1965).

94. See note 77 supra.
95. 65 COLU!lf. L. R.Ev. at 1008.
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executive a viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court constitutional construction. While theoretically the period of limbo could
continue indefinitely, as a practical matter the federal system would
not tolerate such an indefinite state. Assuming a conflict between
the Congress and the Court on a question of constitutional construction, the conflict would, in the course of time, work itself out through
the political process. Congress and the Court would each have available for combat the same array of weapons as under the judicial supremacy model. The crucial distinction between the competing
models is in the conception of oughtness which would prevail while
the combat continues. Until resolution of the conflict, Congress,
under judicial supremacy, would be acting illegally each time it
rejected the Court's constitutional construction; under viable tension, the congressional rejections would be legal. Under either
model, the conflict would move eventually to resolution. Thus,
neither model immunizes the federal system against political conflict among the three branches of the federal government. Judicial
supremacy would label the non-Court contestant a ·wrongdoer; 00
reflecting more closely the realities of power, viable tension would
remove the label.
Instead of Congress, assume that the President is in conflict with
the Court. Because of the Court's dependence on the federal executive for the enforcement of its orders, the initial advantage in this
conflict would almost certainly lie with the President. Against the
President's control of the federal government's enforcement machinery, the Court's weapon of moral suasion would, at the outset,
have little practical effect. If, however, Congress, supported strongly
by public opinion, entered the arena on the side of the Court, the
realities of political power would probably shift to the Court's advantage. Absent megalomania, no President would be likely to persist, for any extended period of time, in a position that arouses the
intense hostility of the Court, Congress, and the general public. Viable tension would not lead inevitably to presidential supremacy.
In conflict resolution among the federal branches, the preceding
96. On the propriety of labeling Congress a wrongdoer in this situation, a quote
from Justice Holmes is apt: " ••• it must be remembered that legislators arc the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree
as the courts." Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270 (1904).
Concerning the responsibility of Congress to determine independently the constitutionality of legislation before its enactment, see Hearings on S. 1732 (the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2000a-b (1970))
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 431-ll2 (1963)
(colloquy between Senator Warren G. Magnuson, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Comm.
on Commerce and James J. Kilpatrick, former editor of the Richmond News-Leader),
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paragraph suggests that any one branch would normally have a
difficult time prevailing over the united opposition of the remaining two branches. If this is so, why not construct a model that reflects this reality, a model of "prevailing-majority viable tension"?
Under this model, if two branches of the federal government agree
expressly on a question of constitutional construction, the third
branch would be legally obligated to accept that construction. Because it attempts to match obligation closely to power, such a model
has some pragmatic appeal. But lacking the historical support that
viable tension can claim,97 such a principle appears somewhat artificial and contrived. Rather than constituting a separate model for
defining the binding effect of a Supreme Court constitutional construction, the prevailing-majority analysis seems more accurately to
constitute a description of how conflict among the federal branches
would generally be resolved. I would recur to viable tension in its
purer form as the more appropriate model for defining the legal
obligation of Congress and the federal executive to comply with a
Supreme Court constitutional construction.

D. The Legislative and Executive Branches
of the State Governments
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; ...os

Sweeping broadly, this subsection includes within "the legislative and executive branches of the state governments" all legislative
and executive branches functioning within political subdivisions
created under state authority. More technically, this subsection comprehends any legislative and executive action which constitutes "state
action" 99 within the meaning of the fourteenth amendment. For ease
of discussion throughout this subsection, the phrase "legislative and
executive branches of the state governments" will be compressed to
"state governments." Any state action primarily judicial in nature
97. See notes 75-84 supra and accompanying text.
98. U.S. CoNST., art. VI.
99. The unfolding saga of the state action concept is beyond the scope of this article.
The literature on the subject is voluminous. See Henkin, Shelley v. Kramer: Notes for a
Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 473 (1962); Horowitz, The Misleading Search for
"State Action" Under the Fourteenth Amendment, 30 CAI.IF. L. R.Ev. 208 (1957); Lewis,
The Meaning of State Action, 60 COLtJM. L. R.Ev. 1083 (1960); Van Alstyne & Karst,
State Action, 14 STAN. L. REv. 3 (1961); Williams, The Twilight of State Action, 41
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 347 (1963); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L.
R.Ev. 1065, 1069-72 (1969).
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would be covered by the earlier analysis of state courts100 and is not
considered here.
I would apply to the state governments a slightly modified form
of judicial supremacy. With one exception, state governments should
be obligated to comply instantly with a Supreme Court constitutional construction, both in the particular case before the Court
and in all future fact situations raising the same legal issue. The one
exception is tied to action by Congress or the federal executive. If
either Congress or the federal executive expressly rejects the Court's
constitutional construction, the state governments, at their discretion, would be free to do likewise. However, absent an express rejection by Congress or the federal executive, the state governments
would be obligated to follow the Court's construction until changed
by the Court itself or by constitutional amendment. Phrased practically, state governments can escape judicial supremacy only through
the action of Congress or the federal executive.
Why concede this escape hatch to state governments? The concession flows irresistibly from the application of viable tension to
Congress and the federal executive. As long as the three branches of
the federal government agree on a question of constitutional construction, federal supremacy dictates state government compliance.
When the federal government speaks as a unit, state governments
cannot feign ignorance of the federal government's command. When,
however, the federal government does not speak as a unit, the state
governments may ask legitimately, "Which branch of the federal
government should we obey?" Concretely, if Congress expressly rejects a Supreme Court constitutional construction, Congress, as much
as the Court, represents the federal government to the states. Here,
the federal government's trumpet bears an uncertain sound. As long
as the contest continues between Congress and the Court, the state
governments should be free to choose their champion in the lists.
They should be free to influence the contest through support of the
constitutional construction they deem correct. Once the contest is
resolved at the federal government level, the prevailing constitutional construction would again become binding upon the state
governments. And, as in the contest just resolved, only a subsequent
rejection by Congress or the federal executive could spark a new
contest with the Court.
In applying modified judicial supremacy to state governments,
the school prayer issue is the paradigm. In School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 101 the Supreme Court held that a state
100. See text accompanying notes 44-52 supra.
101. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
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cannot require prayer reading in the public schools. Modified judicial supremacy would make the Court's constitutional construction
instantly binding on all public school districts in the land. More
broadly, all state governments would be obligated immediately to
conform their future conduct to the Schempp requirements. The
obligation imposed on state governments and the school districts
operating under their authority would extend, not only to the formal
parties in Schempp, but to all fact situations fairly covered by the
Schempp holding. Only an express rejection of Schempp by Congress or the federal executive would release state governments and
their school districts from the obligation defined in this paragraph.
Until such a rejection occurred, the Court's constitutional construction in Schempp would be truly the supreme law of the land for state
governments. In actuality, neither Congress nor the federal executive
has rejected Schempp, a highly controversial decision.102 This fact
illustrates that modified judicial supremacy has a practical potency
for state governments which will be affected only rarely by the
congressional or presidential escape hatch.103
The wording of the Constitution strongly supports the application of modified judicial supremacy to the state governments. The
supremacy clause connotes federal government supremacy over state
governments in the areas of authority delegated to the federal government under the Constitution. This was the interpretation given to
the clause in McCulloch v. Maryland, 104 and history has made this
interpretation an integral part of the federal system.105 Although
McCulloch involved state government defiance of a congressional
act, the application of federal supremacy should not be limited to
acts initiated by Congress. It should apply with equal force to acts
initiated by the federal executive or the Supreme Court. So viewed,
federal supremacy does not depend upon which branch of the federal
government initiates the act in question; rather, it depends upon the
unity of the federal government in relation to the act.106 As long as
the federal government speaks as a unit in support of the act, federal
102. See Heaney and Beiser, supra note 88.
103. See text accompanying notes 86-89 supra.
104. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 424 (1819).
105. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968) (upholding the extension of the
Fair Labor Standards Act to employees of state schools and hospitals); United States
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961) (upholding against the conflicting provisions of Oregon
probate law a federal statute regulating, under specified circumstances, the distribution
at death of a veteran's personal property).
106. The discussion of this paragraph assumes always that the federal government,
in the opinion of all three of its branches, is acting in an area of authority delegated
to it under the Constitution. Obviously, under the viable tension model, this assump•
tion itself could be the object of disagreement among the three branches.
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supremacy should preclude state government repudiation of the act.
Moreover, the continuing presumption should be in favor of federal
government unity in the absence of express disagreement among its
three branches. Specifically, a Supreme Court constitutional construction occurs often without prior action by Congress or the
federal executive; 107 in other instances, such prior action galvanizes
the Court response.108 In either event, the Court's construction is an
act by one branch of the federal government. Until repudiated expressly by Congress or the federal executive, this act of construction
should carry an immediate and continuing presumption of validity
as against the state governments. The constitutional mandate . of
federal supremacy requires nothing less.
Equally with the wording of the Constitution, predictability becomes a second policy factor strongly supporting the application of
modified judicial supremacy to the state governments. Consider
again the second sentence of Justice Holmes' statement concerning
judicial review: "I do think that the Union would be imperiled if
we could not make that declaration [of unconstitutionality] as to the
laws of the several states."109 As noted earlier, this statement recognizes, on the issue of judicial review, a hierarchy of urgency among
the several parts of the federal system. On the related issue of a
Supreme Court decision's binding effect, the hierarchy of urgency
is even more dramatic. It is one thing to grant Congress and the
federal executive a viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court
constitutional construction. Here, the right is confined narrowly,
and history indicates that it may be rarely asserted. It is a drastically different thing to grant this same right of rejection to fifty
state governments and their multitudinous political subdivisions.
Here, history evidences amply that state governments would exercise their right of rejection frequently, sometimes defiantly, and
often with little concern for the national interest.110 On many issues
107. Typical of this situation are cases in which the Court reviews the constitution•
ality of prior state action. E.g., School Dist. of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (review of a state statute requiring the reading in public schools of a
state-prescribed prayer); and Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (review
of state statutes requiring or authorizing racial segregation in public schools).
108. Typical of this situation are cases in which the Court reviews the constitutionality of prior congressional or presidential action. E.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486 (1969) (review of Adam Clayton Powell's e.xclusion from membership in the
House of Representatives).
109. 0. Hou.ms, supra note 64, at 296.
110. For instance, Governor Wallace's resistance of a court desegregation order by
standing in the gateway of a public school is brought to mind. See N.Y. Times, June
12, 1963, at 1, col. 8. More broadly, one can readily predict the result of according to
public school districts a viable tension right to reject the Supreme Court's constitu-
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of constitutional construction, regional defiance of the Court would
become the prevailing norm. The resulting constitutional fratricide
would make a shambles of the federal system. Wearing different
garb, the discredited doctrine of interposition would win a belated
victory.111
Even more fundamentally, pure viable tension ignores the person affected adversely by state government defiance of the Supreme
Court. Here, the urgency of predictability is acute. If, at their own
volition, state governments can legally reject Court decisions, persons
affected by these decisions must operate in a maze of uncertainty.
The constitutional rights secured by these decisions would exist at
state government sufferance. Nor is it sufficient to say that state governments must accept the Court's constitutional construction only
in the particular case before the Court. This meets only partially the
needs of predictability. While it is true technically that a court decision binds only the parties before the court,112 as applied to state
governments the federal system requires a more generous conception
of judicial power. To give a Supreme Court constitutional construction its proper scope, it must be held to bind instantly the state governments in all fact situations to which the construction is fairly
applicable. Even with its scope thus extended, the construction will
often require piecemeal litigation for its effective implementation.
But, to restrict the construction's binding effect to the particular
case before the Court is to invest state delay tactics with the aura of
legality. The school prayer and school desegregation decisions illustrate the difficulty of implementing a Supreme Court constitutional
construction against a recalcitrant state government. At the very
least, the federal system should saddle that recalcitrance with the
burden of legal opprobrium. In this context, the Court's construction, not the state government's dissent, should reap the benefits
of oughtness.
tional constructions in Brown and Schempp. See Blaustein and Ferguson, Avoidance,
Evasion and Delay, Birkby, The Supreme Court and the Bible Belt: Tennessee Reaction
to the "Schempp" Decision, Johnson, Compliance and Supreme Court Decision Making,
in THE IMPACT OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS (T. Becker ed. 1969).

111. Under this doctrine, state governments, at various points in history, have asserted the right to "interpose" their own construction of the Constitution against federal action. In Bush v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 364 U.S. 500 (1960), the Supreme
Court bluntly rejected the doctrine, observing that "'interposition is not a constitutional doctrine. If taken seriously, it is illegal defiance of constitutional authority.'"
364 U.S. at 501, quoting from the three-judge federal district court opinion in Bush,
188 F. Supp. 916, 926 (E.D. La. 1960). See also Reference Note, Interposition vs. Judicial
Power-A Study of Ultimate Authority in Constitutional Questions, I Race Rel. L.
Rep. 465 (1956).
112. See note 24 supra.
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The abstractions of the preceding paragraph need concrete illustration. Turning again to the school prayer issue, why should the
Schempp constitutional construction instantly bind all school districts in the land? Why not limit the decision's binding effect to the
parties before the Court? It is a central thesis of this Article that a
nation's conception of oughtness does make a difference. If school
districts regard themselves as obligated to comply instantly with
Schempp, they will be more likely to comply promptly, without
awaiting legal compulsion. Conversely, if school districts regard their
legal obligation as beginning only with their specific inclusion in a
court order, they will be more likely to delay compliance until that
court order arrives. The same phenomenon operates at a school district's community level. The community's conception of oughtness
will influence the degree of compliance-pressure which the community is willing to exert on the school district officials. Thus, to limit
the binding effect of Schempp to the parties before the Court gives
legal sanction to inertia; it forces inexorably a resort to piecemeal
litigation as the only means of extending the legal effect of the holding
to nonparty school districts. To place a mantle of oughtness on this
tedious process largely deprives the Court's constitutional construction of any immediate efficacy. In practical terms, it authorizes a
school district to say to the federal government, "Catch me, if you
can." Here, the federal system's conception of oughtness "should be
made of sterner stuff."113
Applied to state governments, modified judicial supremacy would
diminish opportunity for political endeavor. Although serious, this
disadvantage loses urgency through application of viable tension to
the co-ordinate branches of the federal government. If Congress and
the federal executive are each conceded a viable tension right to reject a Supreme Court constitutional construction, this concession
provides an ample safety valve for political pressure within the federal system. There is no need to gild the lily by granting a similar
right to state governments. In effect, because it can flourish elsewhere in the federal system, opportunity for political endeavor becomes a policy factor supporting viable tension only modestly at the
state government level.
Nor would modified judicial supremacy divorce obligation from
power. A state government's obligation to follow the Court would
continue until express repudiation of the Court by Congress or the
federal executive. Absent such repudiation, Congress and the federal
113.

w. Shakespeare, JULIUS

OF SHAKESPEARE

CAEsAR,

648 (Wright ed. 1936).

Act III, ii, line 94, in

THE COMPLETE WORKS
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executive would, by definition, support the Court. For example,
enforcement of the Court's holding in the particular case would
signal federal executive support of the Court in future cases raising
the same constitutional issue.114 Accordingly, the full panoply of
federal power would always be available to enforce against state
governments precisely the obligation which modified judicial supremacy requires. Conversely, at precisely the time when congressional or presidential repudiation of the Court would divide and
weaken federal power, the compliance obligation of state governments would cease to exist. Obligation and power would largely
coalesce. Moreover, under modified judicial supremacy, only a regional grouping of state power approaching the magnitude of the
Confederacy in the Civil War could cause a substantial divergence
between obligation and power. And even there, federal power
eventually held sway. Concededly, state governments, through various
tactics of active and passive resistance, can obstruct significantly the
enforcement of Supreme Court decisions. If, however, the federal
government remains unified in its support of a Supreme Court constitutional construction, the power reality is that the Court's construction will prevail ultimately over conflicting state action.
Where does this leave the public school principal who disagrees
with the Supreme Court's constitutional construction in Schempp?
Like the school children in Tinker v. Des Moines School District,115
it can be said of a school principal that he does not "shed [his] constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate."116 Accordingly, the principal would have a constitutional right to criticize Schempp robustly. More precisely, if the
principal's speech falls short of advocacy which "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite
or produce such action," 117 his speech would be protected constitutionally under the current Supreme Court standards. The principal, however, would have an equally clear constitutional duty to
implement Schempp immediately in his own school and to support
its requirements affirmatively with the power of his office without
awaiting the compulsion of a specific court order.
114. See Titles IlI and IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000(b)-(c)(9)
(1970), for an example of congressional support of the Court's constitutional construction in Brown. Here, Congress enacted legislation which has enhanced the ability of
private citizens and the United States Attorney General to secure the desegregation of
public facilities and of public education.
115. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
116. 393 U.S. at 506.
117. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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E. The Private Citizen Holding
No Public Office
Congress shall make no law .•. abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to
petition the Government for a redress of grievances.11s
The private citizen holding no public office lacks the power
possessed by public officials to block implementation of Supreme
Court decisions. Concededly, the private citizen, particularly in
combination with others, possesses some power in this regard, but
the problem is less acute than when a public official sets the power of
his office against the Court. Still, a private citizen's ability to influence public events is sufficiently strong to merit a brief analysis
of the citizen's relationship to a Supreme Court constitutional construction.
Like the school principal in the preceding subsection, the private
citizen retains at all times his constitutional right to freedom of
expression. Thus, the private citizen has a constitutional right to
engage in vigorous, intemperate, and even crude criticism of a
Supreme Court decision. As an agency of government, the Court
has no greater immunity to verbal attack than Congress or the federal
executive. At the same time, the private citizen has a constitutional
duty not to interfere with the implementation of a Supreme Court
constitutional construction at any level of government. Any such
interference would constitute an unlawful act, whether directed
at a specific court order or a public official's effort at voluntary compliance. Concretely, the private citizen would have a clear duty not
to impede execution of a court order which requires a named school
district to comply with Schempp. Perhaps even more importantly,
the private citizen would have an equally clear duty not to impede
a school district's effort to execute voluntarily the Schempp mandate.
As with the school principal, a private citizen's advocacy is protected unless it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action.'' 11° For
example, if school parents express to the school principal their
belief that Schempp should not be followed in their school, this,
under the Brandenburg standard just quoted, would constitute protected speech. The parents are making only a statement of belief
and are not urging action. If these same parents initiated a campaign
urging teachers at their school to wreck immediately the principal's
efforts at compliance with Schempp, this, under the circumstances
prevalent today in most American school districts, would constitute
118, U.S. CONST., amend, I.
119. 395 U.S. at 447.
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unprotected advocacy, an urging of imminent lawless action under
circumstances where such action is likely to occur.120
If Congress (or the federal executive) expressly rejects a Supreme
Court constitutional construction, this rejection would release the
private citizen from his duty of noninterference. Like the state
official, and for the same reasons,121 the private citizen would then
be free to choose and support his champion among the competing
branches of the federal government. He could urge teachers and
principals to follow immediately the congressional example; because
of Congress' rejection, the citizen would no longer be urging the
commission of an unlawful act. For reasons already stated, congressional or presidential rejection of the Court will occur rarely.122
Accordingly, for the citizen, the duty of noninterference will be the
prevailing reality and should thus receive the main conceptual
stress. Human frailty argues against universal acceptance of this
duty; protection against atomistic chaos requires its adoption as the
governing constitutional standard.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The conclusions reached in this Article are designed to further
four policy goals within the federal system: fidelity to the wording
of the Constitution; predictability of reaction to a Supreme Court
constitutional construction; generous opportunity for political endeavor; and the approximation of legal obligation to the realities
of political power. If advanced too far, each of these policy goals
would encroach unduly on the remaining three. Hence, to maximize
the realization of all four goals, compromise is essential. This compromise occurs through the varying applications of judicial su- ·
premacy and viable tension to the several parts of the federal system.
To apply either of the competing models to all parts of the federal
system would promote some of the enumerated policy goals to the
practical exclusion of others.
In the application of the competing models to the federal system,
judicial supremacy clearly predominates. This is as it should be.
Noncompliance with a Supreme Court constitutional construction
should not be legalized lightly. Generally, the nation's conception of
oughtness should favor the construction's binding force. Without
this prevailing conception of oughtness, the federal system would
120. A detailed analysis of the "free speech" area is beyond the scope of this Article.
See generally Strong, Fifty Years of "Clear and Present Danger": From Schenck to
Brandenburg-And Beyond, 1969 Sup. Ct. Rev. 41, for a discussion of how the Brandenburg test evolved.
121. See text preceding note 101 supra.
122. See notes 83-90 supra and accompanying text.
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disintegrate. In this regard, the application of viable tension to
Congress and the federal executive does legitimate rejection of the
Court by those two branches. Admittedly, this concession carries
some risk of disintegration within the federal system. The risk, however, is confined to the parts of the federal system least likely to
abuse the right of rejection. More importantly, the right of rejection
must exist somewhere if the federal system is to have a legal means of
resisting judicial encroachment in the particular case before the
Court. At the federal government level, I would accept the risk of
disintegration, which history indicates is slight, to preserve the right
of rejection. In response to a Supreme Court constitutional construction, the federal system should offer a wider choice than acquiescence
or illegal repudiation.
Conceptually, my description of the federal system attempts to
match the definition of legal obligation to the realities of political
power. Why this concern? Concededly, the existence of a legal obligation does not depend on whether the obligation can be enforced.
Much of international law, for example, envisions legal obligations
under circumstances where no enforcement power exists.123 Closer
to home, it is quite possible to say that Congress and the federal
executive are obligated legally to comply with a Supreme Court
constitutional construction, even if the power to enforce this compliance is lacking. Here, indeed, the nation's conception of oughtness
could give practical efficacy to the obligation as defined. Granting
all this, the question remains: Why construct a national political
system which risks a wide divergence between obligation and power?
A nation differs from the international community. It is an organized
political system in which the ability to enforce legal obligations is a
vital component of justice. Clearly this is true of legal obligations
which go to the heart of the system under consideration. Within the
federal system, compliance ·with a Supreme Court constitutional
construction is such an obligation. Accordingly, absent a compelling
reason to do otherwise, this obligation should be defined in such
a way as to ensure its enforceability. In a matter essential to its
survival, the federal system should not make a promise that it cannot
keep.
123.••• a law may be established and become international, that is to say binding upon all nations, by the agreement of such nations to be bound thereby, al•
though it may be impossible to enforce obedience thereto by any given nation party
to the agreement. The resistance of a nation to a law to which it has agreed does
not derogate from the authority of the law because that resistance cannot, perhaps,
be overcome. Such resistance merely makes the resisting nation a breaker of the
law to which it has given its adherence, but it leaves the law, to the establishment of which the resisting nation was a party still subsisting.
Osaka Shusen Kaisha v. Owners of the S.S. Prometheus, 2 Hongkong L.R. 207,225 (1904)
(opinion of Acting Chief Justice Berkeley). See also J. BRIERLY, supra note 6,

